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Germany, Great Britain, and Switzerland are usually considered to be the dominant 
powers in the European chemical industry, since they are associated with companies of 
international stature such as Bayer, BASF, ICI, Ciba-Geigy and Sandoz.  Founded decades 
ago, these firms have marked the sector dynamics with their strategies regarding academic 
relations, the importance of patents, diversification within a multidivisional structure, and 
internationalization.  At first sight, France would seem to be a less important player in the 
European chemical industry.  However, today it is ranked second in Europe, just behind 
Germany, and with a greater annual growth rate, as shown in the table below.  The current 
position of the French chemical industry is a result of two simultaneous factors:  a change in the 
relative activity of sectors, and the repositioning of companies.  This paper will examine the 
strategies used by the four French firms that today are the major players in achieving France’s 
unexpected success:  Atofina, the chemicals division of Total-Fina-Elf; Aventis, the company 
formed by a merger between Hoechst Life Sciences and Rhône-Poulenc; L’Oréal; and Air 
Liquide.
1 The companies have differing histories with regards to the characteristics of the firm at 
its creation, the consequences of the oil crisis, and recent mergers and acquisitions. 
 
Table 1:  Breakdown of turnover by country in 2000 and mean annual growth rate by volume 
 from 1990 to 2000  
 
Country   Turnover as % EU turnover In 2000 
 
Mean growth1990 – 2000 
Germany 22.1%  2.3% 
France  16.7%  i.e. 82 Geuros  3.3% 
Great Britain  11.3%  3% 
Italy 10.6%  1.3% 
Belgium 8.1%   
Spain   7.5%   
Netherlands 6.7%   
                                                  
1 The choice of these companies obviously reflects a number of assumptions about what constitutes the chemical 
industry. Are the pharmaceutical and cosmetics industries part of it? Does it include the oil industry? At European 
level, the OECD consolidates statistics regrouping sectors of activity mentioned in Table 2. The oil industry is not 
included, whereas pharmaceutical products and cosmetics are. In contrast, in the United States, the conventions are 
different; the pharmaceutical industry is separate as is the cosmetics industry while the oil industry is part of the 
chemical industry. We favored the European conventions, feeling it was important to use a definition consistent with 
the scope of most major French and European companies. The major European chemical groups have historically 
developed a pharmaceutical activity that is of increasing importance and has only recently become autonomous. Oil 
companies have developed a petrochemical activity since the 1960s, in the case of France, today these are grouped 
in Atofina. 
 







































Author manuscript, published in "The Global Chimical Industry in the Age of the Petrochimical Revolution (2007) 251-284"Switzerland 5.4%  9.2% 
Ireland 4%   
Others 7.6%   
EU 490  Geuros  3.3% 
 
Sources CEFIC-UIC 
  The table below shows the change in the chemical industry over the past 25 years by 
presenting the respective weights of various sectors of activity in Europe and France in 2000, 
and the mean growth of each one over the last decade.  Pharmaceutical activities and some 
specialty sectors (perfumes and toiletries) have grown, often at the expense of more traditional 
sectors of activity on which the growth of the chemical industry has historically been based 
since the Second World War.  At the same time, companies in the sector have been 
transformed, first by internationalization, and then by intensive concentration and specialization.  
 
Table 2. Breakdown by activity sector in 2000 for the European Union and France: 









plastics and polymers 




21.6%   Parachemicals*  17%  2.3% 
Agriculture 4.2%  1.1%       





12.5% 1.6%  Soaps  &  perfumes 16% 4.5% 
Pharmaceuticals 25.2%  4.9%  Pharmaceuticals 34%  4.5% 
*Parachemicals include paint, glue, varnish, ink, cleaning products, cosmetics and phyto-sanitary 
products used directly by clients. (www.sarpindustries.fr/anglais/metier_chimie_centre2.htm) 
 
  The case of Rhône-Poulenc in France, demonstrates the first of three possible paths of 
development.  Like other major diversified European groups, such as ICI in England, Hoechst 
and Bayer in Germany, Ciba-Geigy and Sandoz in Switzerland, it was directly affected by the oil 
crisis, then by market stagnation and a drop in commodity prices.  In the 1990s, these 
companies engaged in specialization and concentration, leading to the creation of separate 
companies for pharmaceutical activities on one hand, and other chemical activities on the other.  
Rhône-Poulenc, a 100 -years old chemical group, was nationalized in 1982 at the time of 
reorganization of the industry by the government,
2  expanded its activity in the life sciences 
continuously from the middle of the 1980s, made its specialty chemicals sector independent by 
creating Rhodia in 1998, and finally merged with Hoechst Life Sciences, creating Aventis at the 
end of 1999.   
Air Liquide and L’Oréal demonstrate a second possible trajectory.  These historically 
specialized companies have grown continuously due to strategies of alliance, 
                                                  
2 With this restructuring, two large French companies, Pechiney and Saint-Gobain, having historically developed 
chemical activities had to give away their assets in this sector to specialize on raw material.  
 
 






































8internationalization, and innovation, developing uses and applications for chemical products with 
their customers.  Today, they appear as national champions.  We will examine these companies 
and the characteristics of their growth process. 
A third path covers activities in the oil industry.  In France, the role of the national 
government has been extremely important in the organization and development of these 
activities.  We will examine this path based on the key events that have marked the history of 
the oil industry in France and that led to the formation of Atofina. 
Rhône-Poulenc and the strategy of specialization and concentration 
Specialization, internationalization, merger and acquisition, are the common 
characteristics of the three trajectories.  Nonetheless, we should stress that differences are also 
important.  Each of the trajectories explains part of the evolution in the chemical industry and is 
worth more detailed investigation.  In this section, we describe the process that led the 
diversified group, Rhône-Poulenc, to reposition itself in the life sciences and finally cede its 
chemical activities with the creation of Rhodia.
3  To a certain extent, this evolution is the exact 
opposite of that of Total-Fina-Elf, which kept all its chemical activities in the petroleum group 
and made the pharmaceutical branch autonomous with the creation of Sanofi-Synthélabo. The 
trajectory of Rhône-Poulenc is interesting for several reasons.  First, as stated in the 
introduction, many European chemical groups present diversified product portfolios similar to 
that of Rhône-Poulenc and have followed parallel strategies, separating chemical and 
pharmaceutical activities into independent companies.  Second, the pharmaceutical activities in 
the national chemical industry figures are important and show strong growth.  Determining the 
specific features of this activity, as spotlighted by the gradual separation process that occurred 
in Rhône-Poulenc, helps to explain the sector dynamics.  Finally, the redefinition of the 
company’s field of activity is recent, but so radical and irreversible that tracing the process that 
led to this point would seem to be a most robust analytical strategy. 
  Rhône-Poulenc, the mother company of Aventis, was created on a portfolio of 
diversified products.  Its growth was driven by the development of chemical products such as 
synthetic fibers, and mastery of major processes to synthesize commodities.  In the early 1990s, 
the firm was still producing a broad spectrum of products and was organized into five major 
sectors:  fibers and polymers, major intermediates, fine chemicals, agrochemicals, and 
pharmaceuticals. 
The history of Rhône-Poulenc is generally traced back to 1895, with the creation of the 
“Société Chimique des Usines du Rhône,” which produced dyes and raw materials for 
perfumes, and the creation in 1900 of the “établissements des Frères Poulenc,” which produced 
substances used in pharmacy and textile dye.  In 1928, the two companies merged and became 
the ”Société des usines chimiques Rhône-Poulenc.”   At that time, the company synthesized 
and marketed products with therapeutic properties, as well as products for other uses 
(packaging, detergents).  Distribution via hardware stores, the principal network for chemical 
products in the first half of the century, reflected this mix of products of varied uses.  From the 
start, the company based its growth on both chemical and pharmaceutical products.  The 
historic factories at Saint-Fons and Vitry produced vanillin, aspirin and synthetic colorants at the 
                                                  
3 The materials used as the basis for the analysis were gathered by three methods: examination of a course for 
project leaders (access to about one hundred ongoing projects in the company), more detailed analysis of over a 
dozen projects based on interviews with the project teams, and finally, a longitudinal approach monitoring a project 
throughout its life (two years). Charue-Duboc & Midler 94, 95, 98 
 






































8former, and stovain (one of the first synthetic anesthetics) and photography products at the 
latter.  This positioning is similar to that of other large European chemical companies.  
After the Second World War, development of synthetic fibers drove the firm’s growth and 
allowed various acquisitions.  Savings from large-scale production of products, basic chemicals 
and innovative processes were the dominant characteristics of the firm, although its product 
portfolio remained diversified with fine chemicals and pharmaceuticals.  
However, several years of deficit, the slowdown in the chemical sector, and the oil crisis 
led to the reorganization of the French chemical industry by the state in 1982. Rhône-Poulenc 
had to cede its activities in fertilizers and petrochemicals, and the company was nationalized.  
Elf Atochem (entirely owned by Elf, itself state-owned) took over several of Rhône-Poulenc’s 
commodity assets. 
Figure 2: Evolution of Rhône-Poulenc benefits as a percentage of its sales 
 
  The subsequent period was one of continued reorganization and development of more 
profitable activities.  Acquisitions and divestitures followed one after another, and internal 
rationalization was also conducted.  Since the mid-1980s, there has been continual 
reinforcement of life sciences, with the purchase of divisions of American companies, Union 
Carbide and RTZ in Agrochemicals, Rorer in 1986, and Fison in 1994 in pharmaceuticals.  The 
company, which was once again profitable, was privatized in 1993. 
Figure 3: Evolution of Rhône-Poulenc benefits in the 1980s 
For a century, Rhône-Poulenc favored first agrochemicals, then chemicals and 
petrochemicals, then fibers, and then again agrochemicals and pharmaceuticals.  In this way, in 
spite of sometimes divergent strategies and antagonisms between branches of activity, Rhône-
Poulenc grew, gradually organizing its varied but synergistic activities.  This heterogeneity 
allowed the financing of some external acquisitions (in agrochemicals for example) using cash 
generated by years of high profit in chemical activities.  Another constant during this century of 
development was the important part played by external growth–-acquisitions, partnerships and 
other alliances–marked by periods of major reorganization and divestitures that redefined the 
frontiers of the company and its domain of specialization.  From this history where mergers were 
important, two specialized companies were born:  Aventis and Rhodia. 
From a diversified chemical group to a European pharmaceutical company 
  The creation of Aventis is very recent, at the end of 1999.   Rhodia, which groups the 
chemical activities of Rhône-Poulenc (fibers, intermediates and specialties), was created and 
placed on the stock exchange in 1998.  Rhône-Poulenc reduced its share of Rhodia’s capital to 
less than 28%.  During this same time period, Rhône-Poulenc acquired the Health division of 
Hoechst, becoming Aventis.  With a turnover of 21,000 million euros in 2000, Aventis, together 
with Novartis, has become one of the leading European pharmaceutical enterprises.  Its 
headquarters is located in Strasbourg, and former executives of the two merged companies 
form the top management of this European firm. 
From Rhône-Poulenc to Rhodia and Aventis: a focus on product innovation  
The move towards specialties of the chemicals division and the specialization of the 
pharmaceuticals division 







































While various explanations can be offered as to why chemical activities were separated from 
pharmaceutical activities, this paper concentrates on management of innovation and its 
changes during the last twenty years.  The place of innovation in company strategy is 
increasingly critical in the competitive business world.  In Rhône-Poulenc, transformation of the 
project management mode in the chemicals division reveals the key place of innovation in the 
strategy and type of innovations.  These changes accentuate the differences between the 
chemical and pharmaceutical branch as regards the innovation process.  To understand and 
analyze this trend, we will distinguish three periods.  The first period is characterized by 
company growth based on economies of scale and the preponderance of heavy chemical 
activities.  This results in a project management model, principally dedicated to industrial 
production capacity construction projects.  The second period was a time of transition for the 
group:  increasing the weight of life science activities, and strategic repositioning of the chemical 
branch to specialty chemicals.  During this period, a new project management model emerged 
related to the emphasis on product innovation throughout the company.  Finally, the third period 
corresponds to the anchoring of this innovation based strategy and highlights the increasing 
differences between the life sciences and chemical activities. 
Project management for economies of scale  
The strategic context: a growth driven by “major” products 
Although Rhône-Poulenc’s growth was based on a group of diverse products, ranging 
from therapeutic and crop protection products (copper sulfate), to specialty chemicals 
(colorings, flavorings), intermediates (phenol) and fibers (cellulose acetate), the 1960s and 
1970s saw spectacular growth in the chemicals activities.  This was partly due to the remarkable 
development of synthetic fibers (such as nylon, polyester, and Terylene), which represented 
60% of turnover by the beginning of the 1960s.  It was also partly due to the crucial decision 
taken by Rhône-Poulenc with regard to what was then its leading product–phenol–at a time 
when the chemical industry was shifting to synthesizing processes using petrochemical-based 
material.  Finally, the beginning of the 1970s was marked by acquisitions in heavy-chemical, 
organic-chemical and inorganic-chemical sectors with the purchase of Pechiney, Saint-Gobain 
and Progil (Bibard et al 95). 
Project management at the beginning of the 1980s was related to the strategic model, 
which was an underlying factor in the growth experienced by the company up until 1975, and 
which was based on the production and sale of major products such as Terylene, nylon, 
phosphates, and phenol.  In this context, projects that justified a specific management method 
were the construction projects for new production facilities.  A typical example would be an 
increase in the capacity of a phenol factory, which represented an investment of several 
hundred million francs:  the product is known, as is the process.  The project is restricted to the 
construction of a production unit.  A process, which has been outlined on paper or tested on a 
laboratory pilot, is developed into a full-scale industrial unit.  The project involves finalizing 
process engineering studies in order to define the unit in detail, signing supply contracts, 
optimizing the installation of the main machinery and pipe-work, coordinating the construction 
site, and providing an interface with the host site.  
Characteristics of the project management model 
  The organization and method of undertaking projects, drawn up in the 1980s, were 
similar to those for large building sites (engineering model, Midler 96).  The client would 






































8stipulate their requirements with regard to the production facility (volumes, unitary cost, product 
quality, time-scale of start-up) and the prime contractor—the construction project manager—
would coordinate the various means necessary to construct the facility that had been ordered.  It 
would be the construction project manager who would organize site managers, instrumentation 
experts, purchasers, and draftspeople from the design office, and others.  Such project 
organization is particularly appropriate to Rhône-Poulenc’s matrix structure, which involves a 
partitioning of responsibilities according to activity or product group, and a hierarchical 
organization within each activity, particularly in engineering.  The client belongs to the product 
structure, and is often the industrial director of the “enterprise” (strategic business unit).  The 
main contractor is from engineering.  The quasi-commercial relationship between these two is 
borne out by an internal contract similar to that between a client and a supplier. 
Chart 1: Rhône Poulenc organization ; a matrix structure 
The development of this type of project organization can be explained by the specific 
characteristics of the projects to be carried out; i.e. size of the budgets, large numbers of people 
to be managed, and numerous suppliers.  In such projects, the main uncertainty relates to time-
scale and costs, two aspects brought under control by project monitoring tools.  The planning 
tool makes it possible to plan the project’s time frame and to coordinate the various actions, as 
well as to spot actual delays and anticipate their consequences.  Expenditure control and the 
early identification of discrepancies are facilitated by generic profiles of planned expenditure 
according to the project’s progression.  On such questions as duration and cost, a great deal of 
experience has been capitalized across projects in the engineering department. 
The rise of the life sciences sector and an emphasis on innovation management 
Evolution following the 1982 restructurings 
Following the restructuring of the chemical industry by the State in 1982 and the 
nationalization of Rhône-Poulenc, steps taken during the 1980s to enable the group’s recovery 
later redefined the company.  A number of divestitures were made in the textile, heavy chemical 
and petrochemical areas (Lane S.J.).  Some were decided during the reorganization conducted 
by the French government, while others were concluded directly with private companies.   
However, the second half of the 1980s was marked by acquisitions in agrochemicals (the 
agrochemical division of Union Carbide in 1986), pharmaceuticals (Pasteur vaccines, 
Connaught, Virogenetics, Rorer in 1990) and specialties (RTZ).  Thus, between 1986 and 1991, 
40 billion French francs were invested in acquisitions.  These acquisitions had also a significant 
role in the internationalization of the French group.   
In the early 1990s, cyclical effects within the chemical industry again challenged the 
strategy of mass economy and economies of scale.  Manufacturing over-capacity and economic 
under-performance in the downstream sectors, together with an increase in production costs 
resulted in a drop in world prices for standardized products.  Competition from countries with 
cheap labor also proved to have a particularly negative impact on this type of strategy. 
Figure 4 : Rhône-Poulenc operating margin by sector 
The agrochemical division, with the acquisition of the agrochemical division of Union 
Carbide, saw its turnover rise from 6.5 billion francs in 1986, to 10.5 in 1989, while the 
operational margin increased from 7.9% to 11.4% over the same period.  At the beginning of the 
1990s, the agrochemical and pharmaceutical activities already represented 48% of the turnover 






































8in 1991, while in the 1960s, the chemicals division and fibers represented 80% of turnover.  
These numbers can serve as a reference for fixing objectives for other sectors:  15% of 
operational margin with regard to turnover.  The company was cited for its exemplary innovation 
strategy, and its capacity–-thanks to the production and marketing of innovative products-–to 
maintain high margins.  The sectors in the life sciences came to exemplify the new models of 
economic excellence.  Jean René Fourtou, CEO of Rhône-Poulenc from 1986 to 2002 probably 
had that vision early on and led the group to Rhodia and Aventis. 
Figure 5: Rhône-Poulenc sales by sector of activity 
Search for synergies; innovation management as means of integration 
Following this period of divestitures and acquisition, the 1990s saw a focus on the 
internal organization of the different sectors of activity in order to consolidate their positions, 
bring together teams with differing histories from various backgrounds, and gain maximum 
benefit from the synergies between these recently united entities.  Amid the internal 
rationalization at the beginning of the 1990s, an initiative was launched relating to innovation 
project management.  In the 1990s, project management was a managerial fashion that came 
from the automobile industry (Clark and Fujimoto 91, Midler 93). It was hardly surprising that 
Rhône-Poulenc headquarters noted its importance for the company, since it was being 
implemented in several industrial sectors.  Project management requires integration between 
services and the various specialty areas, and also relates to the company’s internal team 
management. 
  From 1992 onwards, innovation project management was referred to in communications 
from the general management as one of the five key areas to be developed.  The aim was to 
provide the best possible prospects for growth while at the same time achieving double-figure 
margin levels in terms of percentage of turnover.  It therefore played a pivotal role as far as the 
company’s competitive position was concerned, and affected all of the group’s business 
activities and sectors.   
  Innovation project management at Rhône-Poulenc began initially with a benchmarking 
initiative between the various divisions.  At the beginning of the 1990s there were five such 
divisions:  organic and inorganic intermediates, specialty chemicals, fibers and polymers, 
agrochemicals, and health.  This type of approach demonstrated a desire to draw upon the 
group’s diversity and to exchange the techniques and expertise developed in the various 
divisions in order to capitalize on, unite and improve project management in each of the 
divisions.  R&D managers from the various divisions formed a working group for exchanging 
their various related experiences, which operated for one year.  The end result was a white 
paper on project management setting out best practices, which was in fact a list of 
recommendations.  The white paper also included a self-assessment guide, designed to help 
each sector identify any necessary action for improvement. Two points need to be emphasized.  
The first is that the life science activities, where several major innovative products were being 
developed, rapidly proved to be the model to follow.  At management level, the project 
management initiative was led by the former agrochemicals director.  The second is that, at a 
time when operational management was being decentralized, it quickly became clear that there 
was a need to develop a project management “doctrine” for each division.  The second stage 
was then to ask each division to put forward action plans, with a view to improving the 
implementation of project innovation.  






































8Strategic redirection towards chemical specialties and emergence of a new project 
management model 
Innovation projects in the chemical division 
For the chemical division, implementing a strategy similar to that of the life sciences 
division meant exploring a greater variety of products and their properties, instead of being 
mainly geared towards developing new synthesizing processes for products that were already 
well known.  Since in the 1980s the division had concentrated on major products and on 
economies of scale, innovation was confined to improving processes, and development of 
innovative products was not at the forefront.  The chemicals division began structuring the 
development of innovative products/services/processes referred to as ”innovation projects” in 
the white paper.  Greater emphasis was placed on product innovation.  Innovation projects were 
set to develop specialty products (pigments, solvent-free paints, additives for recycling and so 
on) for niche markets.  Basic products were reworked in order to achieve the properties required 
for specific applications (silica for tires, phosphates for the treatment of salmonella).  These 
projects marked a change from a strategy based on major standardized products to a strategy 
of offering innovative products that had been optimized for specific uses (Cohendet, et al. 84, 
89; Colombo, 80).  This emphasis on innovation project was both a sign and an integral part of 
the strategic redirection towards specialty chemicals that the chemicals division had taken.  This 
decision was, no doubt, based on a comparison with the life sciences sectors.  This redirection 
led to a progressive yet profound change in the style of project management.  A new method of 
project management emerged that was significantly different from what had been previously 
used (as described above).  The project scope changed:  research activities (exploring the 
technical characteristics of a new product and conditions for synthesis), marketing activities, an 
understanding of product use, market analysis and industrialization were incorporated into a 
unified and integrated project.  Projects were no longer limited to the phase of industrializing a 
process and building a unit.  A multidisciplinary team was created.  A project manager was 
dedicated to the project for its whole course.  He was in charge of the overall success of the 
project.  This project organization had many similarities with the heavyweight project 
management model (Clark and Wheelwright 92, Midler, 93). 
Some specificities of innovation project management 
Concurrent engineering (Navarre 93) was developed as the result of various factors:  
there was an overall project responsibility; the project scope incorporated the various aspects; 
shortening the time-to-market for new products was very important from a competitive point of 
view; and uncertainty was very high.  Uncertainty lay with the process, as well as with the 
suitability of the product vis-à-vis the clients’ uses, its acceptability, and with comprehension of 
its most sought-after properties, and therefore those most capable of generating value for the 
product and, potentially, profit. Managing uncertainty required the ability to integrate new 
information at any step of the project and to react quickly because of the virtual impossibility of 
foreseeing properly on all these dimensions.  A client analysis approach was adopted to study 
product usage and the various processing intermediaries up until the product reached the end 
user.  Expertise within the firm had to be developed with regard to product properties for the 
processor, on the one hand, and with regard to the transformation processes, and particularly 
required properties, on the other.  Application laboratories and applicability teams were set up.  
Application laboratories studied the end-use properties of the finished product in the 
composition of which the chemical product was used.  For example, the anti-foam properties of 
a silicone to be used in the composition of a washing powder would be measured and 
characterized.  The role of applicability laboratories was to establish correlations between 






































8physico-chemical properties of molecules and their application properties.  Such understandings 
were key at the product development stage in order to direct the development process and to 
fine-tune marketing strategies. 
The relationship with clients was also transformed; from price and volume negotiations 
for a given quality, partnerships began to develop with clients to explore jointly the properties of 
the product under development and decide which one was the more valuable for the consumer.  
This trend of development of win-win partnership is similar to that described in the automotive 
industry (Garel Kesseler 98) between the car manufacturer and their main suppliers.  The 
chemicals division therefore underwent a series of fundamental transformations:   
--transformation as far as product strategies were concerned, from standardized 
products sold for their physico-chemical specifications to diversified products targeted in 
relation to the client for their properties in specific applications;  
--transformation as far as the methods of innovation and project management were 
concerned, leading to the development of a closer relationship between researchers and 
markets, and the establishment of integrated teams (research, process, marketing), 
whereas in the past these had been sequential and compartmentalized; 
--transformation with regard to external relations leading to the establishment of 
development partnerships based on complementing the expertise of each of the 
partners, and not on direct pursuit of external growth. 
Figure 6: Comparative evolution of Rhône-Poulenc and Rhodia during the 1990s 
This transformation took several years:  in 1991-92 the need for a strategic repositioning was 
identified; in 1995 the specialty and raw chemicals branches merged; and in 1998 Rhodia was 
created and progressively separated from the rest of Rhône-Poulenc.  
For such a strategic evolution to be successful, several learning processes needed to 
occur.  These learning processes had to take place at different levels and in various areas of the 
organization.  New skills had to be built within the application and applicability labs; new 
relationships had to be set up with clients based on a larger market knowledge and better 
understanding of the client constraints and stakes; new project management methods had to be 
implemented involving the learning of new behavior such as working and coordinating actors 
under uncertainty; and lastly, the company had to learn how to select projects in a portfolio in 
order to balance different kinds of risk and different timing.  Today, the results of this new 
strategy still appear fragile, as can be seen in the graph below. The evolution, however, is 
irreversible because of the divestiture undertaken in the commodities.  Learning processes have 
already developed but remain to be completed.  The challenge for the company is to reinforce 
its position as an innovative company that can survive “bad” years (currency exchange rate, 
economic cycles) with reduced benefits but no deficits.  This innovative dynamic has already 
proven fruitful with 14% of new products contributing to the group sales and an increase in the 
group’s market share in eight strategic markets.  Nevertheless, today, debt related to previous 
deficits and acquisition is negatively impacting the results.  In addition, bad economic conditions 
have slowed learning processes because cost cuts often strongly affect R and D expenses, and, 
as a consequence, new product development.   
This fundamental transformation, in which the life sciences sector was to have such an 
instigative and referential role, might have brought the sectors closer together. In fact, to a 






































8certain extent, that came about as a result of the replication of the same strategic model, thus 
leaving the way open for product innovation.  The aim was to establish competitive ranking by 
introducing new products, which improved on existing products, and to optimize profitability by 
adding value to the client system.  Contrary to the premise that the chemicals division would 
imitate the strategic model of the life sciences division, it would seem that the chemicals 
division’s strategic redirection actually intensified differences.  It could even be said that these 
differences were more limited when the chemicals division followed a strategy of economies of 
scale, and that they paradoxically became more pronounced after the strategic move towards a 
competitive model through innovation. 
Innovation processes: differences between pharmaceuticals and chemicals 
In the preceding sections, emphasis has been placed on the manner in which project 
management was transformed in the chemicals division.  Indeed, it was in this division that the 
changes were the most spectacular.  In the pharmaceutical sector, innovation projects were 
also introduced, but these projects have distinctive characteristics that determine the way they 
are managed.  Consequently, innovation projects actually increased differences compared to 
what had come before.  
The first distinctive characteristic relates to the regulatory requirements, which have 
become increasingly stringent.  Any new drug or agrochemical must undergo an extremely 
detailed examination by regulatory authorities before receiving the authorization to be 
introduced on the market.  The approval dossiers must show the effectiveness of a new product, 
as well as demonstrate its safety (i.e. for the environment and patient health). The dossiers 
contain the results of numerous tests; they describe the product and the manufacturing process 
in great detail. 
The second characteristic is the importance of patents.  As in any industry, patents 
protect companies that have incurred heavy research and development costs from competitors, 
who would otherwise simply need to develop a production process for a product that had 
already been approved.  In the drug industry, the patent system is further strengthened since 
public health authorities will grant market authorization if a therapeutic benefit can be shown 
over existing products.  As this benefit increases, so does the price the public health authority 
will allow.  It is therefore very important to be the first to file for a patent.  In addition, the major 
companies tend to focus on a few potential flagship products and on exploring the same 
therapeutic targets or the same crops.  As a result there is a veritable race to apply for patents.  
These two specificities have had important implications on the evolution of innovation processes 
in the pharmaceutical industry.  
Pharmaceutical and agrochemical groups have tended to concentrate their research and 
development efforts on products that are likely to generate a high turnover, so as to compensate 
for the development costs.  In the past decade, the amount of study required for the approval of 
a product has continuously increased and development costs have become extremely high.  
Companies are thus focusing on high-volume products that are often marketed on a worldwide 
scale, and/or products with high added value, often corresponding to therapeutic or preventive 
products that previously did not exist.  Niche products are not viable in terms of development 
costs, given the narrow market targeted.  Isolated or breakthrough innovation strategies 
(Tushman & Anderson 86) are followed and enabled by patent protection.  On the contrary, 
repeated innovation strategies as observed in the appliances (Chapel 97) and IT industries 
(Brown & Eisenhardt 97) are not required to stay ahead of the competition. 






































8Within the development process, concurrent engineering is almost impossible because 
of regulatory requirements.  Efficacy tests are not allowed unless safety tests have proved 
conclusive.  Efficacy tests must be carried out on a synthesized product according to an 
established manufacturing process.  For any new product development, the major issue at stake 
is obtaining approval.  But the regulatory authorities may quite easily delay market entry by 
requiring additional tests.  Such a delay would leave the way open for a competitor with a 
completed approval dossier to be the first on the market.  Thus, any late modification to the 
process or the product that might optimize its efficiency and the global profitability of the project 
is regarded very carefully as at risk for not getting the authorization on time and having to 
undertake additional tests.  We can say that development planning is governed by this 
regulatory system.   
Pharmaceutical companies prepare the ground for patent application at the earliest 
possible opportunity.  The protection of intellectual property is no longer just a defensive 
strategy: it can also be seen as an offensive strategy, by using patents to protect a wide field, 
thus limiting competitors’ ability to explore promising avenues. Greater co-operation with public 
research establishments is developed because of the importance of patents.  Early identification 
of the most promising new avenues can lead to a speedy investigation of potential drugs.  The 
approval process also gives an ever-greater importance to relationship with the public research 
center.  Scientific recognition of the company research labs by the research community and 
regulatory authority add to the credibility of the approval dossier.  This provides an additional 
opportunity for closer relationships between industrial and public research centers through 
conferences, publications, research partnerships, and recruitment. 
Because of regulatory authorities’ requirements for approval, concurrent engineering is 
very limited, even though time constraints as regards competition for patenting and approval are 
important.  Within this context of increased development costs the focus is more and more on 
“big products” to be sold on a worldwide basis and niche strategies are not attractive from an 
economic point of view.  Because the patent system gives such an advantage to the first on the 
market, alliances, partnerships and mergers are increasing.  This trend for pharmaceutical 
groups to join forces is also designed to provide companies with sufficient financial means to 
engage in increasingly costly development programs.  By choosing alliances or partnerships 
with companies focused on the same therapeutic targets and on molecular compounds, groups 
are ensured access to the global market and to the most promising areas of new development.  
Development partnerships are also set up with research laboratories upstream.  The most 
important ones are definitely not with client downstream or for issues concerning the chemical 
process.   
Affirmation of divergence in product innovation strategy  
 
  In the current context, the common competence on which the chemical and 
pharmaceutical branches were based-–competence in chemical processes and their 
industrialization-–seems only to be of secondary importance.  The competences involving the 
products and their properties and an understanding of the mechanisms that underlie their 
efficacy have become key elements.  The development of these competences draws the 
chemical and pharmaceutical branches in opposite directions. 
The chemical branch has moved away from standardized products manufactured in 
large quantities to concentrate on diversification in specialty products with high margins.  Niche 
and specialty strategies have therefore been developed.  In this type of strategy, patents offer 
less protection from competition.  Indeed, different products may have quite similar properties.  






































8Competition by innovation therefore implies that new innovations be brought onto the market at 
regular intervals.  This is the strategic model of repeated innovation (Hatchuel et al. 98).  Short 
development time is a condition of the competitiveness of this strategy.  The firm must be quick 
to offer a ”me-too” product, or to respond to identified client expectation.  Project organization 
must allow for concurrent engineering.  Implementing this specialty strategy requires an 
understanding of client expectation, the transformation processes they employ, the properties 
they require and how they are measured.  Client partnerships, and even alliances, have been 
set up.  The importance of application and applicability laboratories has also increased.  
In contrast to the chemical branch where downstream development partnerships with 
customers have been developed, in the health sector upstream partnerships with academic 
research centers have been set up.  Their goal is to improve understanding of the mechanism of 
action of medicinal drugs, with a view to registration and patents.  In the chemical branch, highly 
integrated development processes have been instituted.  Concurrent engineering was privileged 
to reduce development delays as far as possible and test products on customers.  In the health 
sector, on the other hand, processes are highly sequential given the regulatory constraints, 
each project targets a major market and a product with a long lifespan, conditions needed to 
offset development costs.  In all, it can be said that if innovation is crucial to both branches of 
activity, it nonetheless presents virtually opposite characteristics for each.  Each branch has 
adopted an innovation strategy consistent with its characteristics.  The chemicals division has 
turned to a repeated innovation strategy while the pharmaceutical branch tries to protect its 
position building barriers to entry that are as durable as possible. 
Companies downstream in the industry and customer oriented  
Air Liquide and L’Oréal were created almost a century ago with private capital to target 
niche markets.  It is only very recently, at the end of the 1990s, that these companies joined the 
leaders in the sector.  We will try to stress a few outstanding features of their growth strategy 
using a macroscopic view. 
Air Liquide, today, is number one worldwide in industrial gases, with a turnover of 8,100 
million euros in 2000.  One-third of its sales are made in the US, half in Europe, and 15% in 
Asia Pacific.  The company was created in 1902 by a chemist, Georges Claude, who had 
developed an acetylene liquefaction process and a process to separate and liquefy oxygen and 
nitrogen in the air.  Innovation, patents and international development have been characteristics 
of the company since its creation.  As early as 1906, the company acquired installations in 
Belgium and Brazil.  In 1907, a patent for neon tubes was obtained.  
After a period of growth, the 1960s saw a reduction in demand.  Air Liquide then decided 
to specialize in the industrial gas market.  Targeted acquisitions allowed it to extend its 
customer base.  In 1969, the firm developed its activities in the United States.  In 1986, Air 
Liquide held 14% of the American market, and with the purchase of Big Three Industry, became 
the second most important producer of industrial gas in the United States. 
Specialization, innovation, and internationalization were virtually continual growth 
vectors.  Innovation allowed the company to reinforce its competitive position and to adapt to 
changes in the market.  When the market for oxygen (for the steel industry) and acetylene 
(welding) declined, new products were developed for the electronics and food sectors (certain 
inert gases improve food conservation). 






































8Finally, since its creation the company has needed to raise capital and has distributed 
dividends.  Today it is still a private company quoted on the Paris stock exchange.  The net 
profit in 2000 was 8% of turnover. 
L’Oréal is the world cosmetics leader with a turnover in 2000 of 12,671 million euros, and 
sales in Europe (51%), the USA (30%) and other countries (19%).  The company traces its 
history back to the chemist, Eugène Schueller.  Having developed a colorant manufacturing 
process, he developed a market for hair dyes.  An eccentric visionary, in 1907 he proposed his 
product to hairdressers and created the Société des Teintures Inoffensives pour Cheveux 
(Society of Dyes Safe for Hair) in 1909.  
The company’s strategy of diversification started in 1928 with the purchase of 
Monsavon.  In 1933, a shampoo for the general public – Dop – was launched.  In 1936, a sun 
cream was marketed for the first paid holidays granted by the Popular Front government.  From 
this time on, the company has been remarkable for its publicity strategy using all possible media 
and designs by the best artists.  
The 1960s and 1970s were marked by a diversification in distribution methods. Hair 
products reserved for professionals (dyes, hairsprays) were introduced onto the public market.  
Several acquisitions in perfumes, beauty creams and cosmetics gave access to the perfume 
distribution network.  In 2000, the company was organized into four branches: professionals 
(hairdressers), the general public (skin and hair care, cosmetics), luxury (cosmetics and 
perfumes), and active cosmetics (skin care).  Sales were 55% on the public market, 27% in 
perfume shops, 12% to hairdressers and 5% for skin care. 
Finally, international development started long ago.  In 1953, L’Oréal sold its products in 
the United States via Cosmair.  In 1994, L’Oréal acquired control of Cosmair, which in 2000 
became L’Oréal USA.  Multiple modes of distribution, an original publicity strategy, and early 
international development have always been characteristics of the company.  
 Although it is positioned in general public products, L’Oréal has always based its new 
products on technical innovations.  Research and patents have played a key part in the 
company’s development.  Hence, when L’Oréal decided to develop anti-aging creams at the 
end of the 1950s, the company formed a research team specializing in these areas.  In 1973, 
L’Oréal even invested large sums in the pharmaceutical sector with the acquisition of 53% of 
Synthélabo.  However, this majority investment did not lead to integration of the companies’ 
activities.  Today, L’Oréal holds 20% of Sanofi-Synthélabo, an autonomous company in the 
pharmaceutical sector. 
Still in private hands, the company’s capital was entirely held by the family until 1963.  At 
that time, Eugène Schueller’s daughter, Lilliane de Bettencourt, sold part of the shares.  In 
1974, a second batch was sold, and the Swiss group, Nestlé, became one of the shareholders.  
Today, 54% of the group is owned by a holding company, Gesparal, of which 51% is held by L. 
de Bettencourt and 49% by Nestlé. 
With similar starting points, Air Liquide and L’Oréal occupy very different market sectors.  
Air Liquide specializes in services to industrial companies, and customized services with a 
strong technical component.  L’Oréal has developed innovative products for the general public 
and supported their development with sophisticated research and marketing actions.  The two 
companies have had similar growth processes: created by chemists through mastery of novel 
chemical processes, relatively unconnected to oil chemicals, they stressed development of their 






































8competence in their products/services and anticipated customer needs.  Growth and 
internationalization are based on alliances and targeted acquisitions, the most fruitful of these 
today date back to the 1960s. 
The Creation of Total-Fina-Elf 
Turning to oil exploitation, the growth of a chemical branch in oil companies, and the role 
of the government in France, we find that Total-Fina-Elf was created following Total’s acquisition 
of the Belgian company, Petrofina, in 1998, and the long state-owned and recently privatized 
French company, Elf Aquitaine, in 1999.  Turnover in 2000 was 114 billion euros.  It is the fourth 
largest petroleum group worldwide.  Sales are split between Europe (54%, with only 31% in 
France), North America (9%), Africa (4%) and the rest of the world (33%).  Atofina was created 
in April 2000 to consolidate the petrochemical activities of the three companies, and is wholly 
owned by the oil group.  Turnover in 2001 was 19.6 billion euros, with 38% for commodity 
polymers, 25% for performance polymers, and 36% for specialties.  The markets are divided, 
with 63% in Europe, 27% in North America, and 10% in the rest of the world. 
The history of Total-Fina-Elf is very different from that of Air Liquide or L’Oréal. The 
company was created around a raw material, and growth in chemicals was a consequence of 
positions upstream in the industry.  It is much more recent.  Describing the origin of the 
company means going back to the creation of its three components: Total, Fina, and Elf.  All 
three were created to exploit petroleum, and national interests were critical in the creation of 
Total and Elf.  Governmental involvement in the strategy of these companies was important, as 
shown by their capital holdings.   
Elf resulted from the consolidation of three entities whose capital was entirely held by the 
French government: the RAP (Autonomous Petrol Board) created in 1939, the SNPA (National 
Society for Aquitaine Oils) in 1941, and the BRP (Oil Research Bureau) in 1945.  The aim of 
these three “companies” was to explore and exploit oil and gas resources in France and its 
colonies.  The politicians’ goal was to make France independent in energy.   
The CFP (French Petroleum Company), which became Total, was created in 1924 to 
develop a petrol industry in France.  The involvement of the French government was 
considerable here, too, providing 25% of the capital on creation, and 35% from 1931.  Each of 
these companies based its development on exploitation of oil resources, refining and distributing 
fuel.  Elf used the gas resources in Lacq in southwestern France, and then Algeria.  Total 
historically developed from the oil fields in Turkey and Iraq. 
Petrofina was created in 1920.  Belgian financial groups took over Rumanian oil 
exploitation installations taken from the Germans during the First World War.  These Soviet oil 
fields, and then American fields in Texas, were exploited before the discovery of North Sea oil. 
The diversification of these companies into the chemical industry occurred during a 
second phase.  The development of chemicals in Total occurred conjointly with Elf with the 
creation in 1971 of Atochimie and Chloé (chlorine and ethylene) in 1980.  In 1981, the 
development of Elf in the United States was boosted by the acquisition of Texas Gulf, which 
added very significant industrial holdings in phosphates and fertilizers.  However, the place of 
Elf in the chemical industry is linked to French industrial policy in the years 1970–1980.  The oil 
crisis in the 1970s led to disastrous results for chemical companies confronted with an increase 
in the price of raw materials and a reduction in the price of chemical products related to 
overcapacity, internationalization of markets and low growth of downstream consumers of 






































8chemical products who were also affected by the oil crisis.  The French government then 
decided to reorganize the chemical industry by redistributing assets between companies and 
nationalizing Rhône-Poulenc.  The industrial policy was intended to limit competition between 
French firms at the national level, and to form large companies capable of competing with their 
rivals at international level.  In 1983, Atochem was created.  This company is wholly owned by 
Elf, which is itself entirely owned by the State.  Atochem regroups the industrial assets of 
Rhône-Poulenc in chlorine and ethylene derivatives, those of Ugine Kuhlman in chlorine and 
fluorine derivatives, and in phosphates.  Atochem then organized its activities into three product 
lines:  bulk products for plastic and chemical materials (ethylene, propylene, benzene styrene), 
plastics and technical polymers and specialties with chlorinated, fluorinated and sulphur 
products.  In 1990, Atochem took another step, acquiring Orkem, the chemical division of 
Charbonnages de France. 
For Fina, diversification in chemicals goes back to the early 1960s, with investment in 
Petrochim (54) and development in the production of ethylene, polyethylene, paint polymers 
(63), and then styrene and polystyrene.  At much the same time, Fina positioned itself in the 
soap segment with Oléochim (1957).  In 1972, Sigma Coatings was created, grouping together 
Fina’s paint interests.  In 1998, Sigma Coating incorporated the activities of Lafarge in paints, 
and is now the third ranked company in Europe in the paint domain.  Fina holds 80% of the 
company, and Lafarge, one of the largest French building companies, the remaining 20%.  In 
1983, Fina was one of the major European producers of high-density polyethylene.  In 1998, 
agreements were concluded with the Belgian company, Solvay, to double the production 
capacity in the next ten years. 
The French government did play an important role, but has been withdrawing since the 
mid-1990s.  First, there was a reduction in direct participation in the capital of Total in 1992 from 
31.7% to 5.4%, then in 1996 to 0.97%.  Elf was privatized in 1996.  These changes in the 
structure of the capital opened the way to the concentration seen afterwards.  Total-Fina-Elf is a 
private company quoted on the Paris and New York stock exchanges with 13% of stable 
shareholders. 
Atofina is, today, divided into three branches: petrochemicals and commodity polymers 
(polyethylene, polypropylene, styrenes, PVC, and others), intermediates and performance 
polymers (chlorine, fluorine, oxygen derivatives, functional polymers, etc.) and specialties (such 
as paint, adhesives, and rubber).  Commodity polymers account for 38%, performance polymers 
for 25%, and specialties for 36% of activity.  
Sanofi-Synthélabo 
Similar to the creation of Atochem in 1973, Sanofi was created by merging several French 
pharmaceutical companies to form a company of international stature.  Initially, the firm was 
entirely held by Elf.  However, in 1979, the capital was opened up, with Elf keeping the majority.  
The company grew by multiple alliances, notably with Japanese companies.  The merger with 
Synthélabo in 1999 accounts for its current stature.  It is the second [largest] French 
pharmaceutical company and the seventh in Europe, with a turnover of 7,508 million euros in 
2000.  The reference shareholders are Total-Fina-Elf  (33%) and L’Oréal (20%) in 2000.  
Conclusion 
Since the Second World War, the chemical industry has gone through several 
evolutions.  Our analysis has specifically focused on the period covering the last 25 years of the 






































820th century.  During this period, the French chemical industry, which has historically based its 
growth on the mastering of high-volume production processes of well-known chemicals, 
progressively changed its position.  Growth was increasingly driven by the use of chemicals in 
various applications:  specialty goods with high value added, diversified products dedicated to 
end-users (in the cosmetics for example) and pharmaceuticals.  This evolution can also be 
traced in society at large:  health expenditure have been continuously growing, consumers are 
looking for personalized and frequently renewed goods.  The demand for these products is as 
much a result of the strategies of the companies as an opportunity they have taken.  The place 
of the French chemical industry today is a result of the strategy that the main companies have 
deployed to face this global evolution. 
In the area of specialty goods, two typical trajectories can be characterized.  The first is 
the continuous growth of companies focused from their creation on a type of specialized 
products, having developed relationships with their customer, gained market knowledge, 
structured new product development and proactively offered new products to their customer.  
Air Liquide and L’Oréal exemplify this strategy.  These companies were founded on the 
mastering of a chemical process, but the exploration and invention of new usages for their 
products and of products with new use value for their customers propelled their rapid growth.  
Air Liquide has diversified the use of industrial gases from traditional customer to electronics 
and food industry for example. L’Oréal has expanded its product portfolio from toilet products to 
cosmetics and skin care. 
The second trajectory is the strategic repositioning of diversified chemical groups that 
have based their growth on commodities and economies of scale and have recently focused 
their activity on specialty products instead.  We have analyzed this strategic change using the 
case of Rhône-Poulenc and its chemical division.  We have underlined the impact of this 
evolution on the organization of product development: coordination between researchers, 
process engineers and marketing people, development of new technical knowledge, new 
relationships with customers.  This evolution led to a new firm:  Rhodia.   
Historically intertwined with the chemical industry in France, the pharmaceutical 
branches of large companies have become autonomous and specialized in pharmaceuticals as 
a result of acquisitions and concentration of pharmaceutical activities to gain a critical size.  This 
evolution has taken place in France as well as in other European countries in the last decade.  
The case of Rhône-Poulenc and its transformation into Aventis is typical of this trend.  The 
specific nature of the regulatory system and the patenting regime as well as the necessity of 
commercializing products on a worldwide basis have induced concentration and specialization 
in this sector.  So despite their common focus on innovation, the pharmaceutical and chemical 
division evolved in diverging direction as far as scientific and industrial partnerships are 
concerned.   
The production of commodities has remained an important component of the chemical 
industry.  Globalization and merger and acquisition have characterized the recent period in this 
activity also.  In France, only companies having assets in oil exploitation have been able to 
remain competitive in raw chemicals.  The intervention of the French government, which has 
been massive at different point in time in the past but which has today become more and more 
limited, is still imprinted on Total-Fina-Elf. The French government was part of the origin of Elf 
and Total because of the importance of oil for industrial development and economic 
independence.  The state as the prime shareholder (indeed, the only one for Elf until the mid 
1990s) has long taken part in the strategic decisions of these companies.  The restructuring 
undertaken by the French government after the oil crisis in 1982 has led to the division of assets 






































8in the raw chemicals between Elf Atochem (created as a subsidiary of Elf totally owned by the 
company) and Rhône-Poulenc which was nationalized.  Today, there is no more state-owned 
company in this industry.  This evolution of the French state from a “hands on” to a “hands off” 
position was a precondition to the mergers that occurred in the late 1990s.  It had led to a 
dramatic change of the industrial policy in this sector in France. 














































Rhone Poulenc Rhodia L'Oreal Air liquide Elf atochem-> Atofina sanofi sy
 
 















































70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83
 

























































Chart 1: Rhône Poulenc organization ; a matrix structure 



















































83 84 86 87 88 89 90 91
 
Figure 4 : Rhône-Poulenc operating margin by sector in the 1980s 
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Figure 5: Rhône-Poulenc sales by sector of activity 
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 Figure 6: Comparative evolution of Rhône-Poulenc and Rhodia net income as a pourcentage of 
sales during the 1990s 
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